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Introduction
Human mobility has existed in countless forms for many centuries. Yet in our
modern world of sovereign territorially defined nation-states, both policy makers and
national publics increasingly see human mobility across national boundaries as alarming.
The rising movement of people, culture and capital across borders is suggested to pose a
direct challenge to the nation-state as the organizing unit around which many areas of
human activity revolve. In the age of globalization, academics and politicans are
investigating how to understand the question of individuals and entire communities,
intent on maintaining strong economic, cultural and social ties across state borders. This
contemporary experience of individuals figuratively having each leg in a different
country has been theorized under the rubric of ‘transnationalism’, a term coined by
American social scientists in the 1990’s who aimed to explain the myriad of cultural,
social and economic undertakings of migrants in both their country of origin as their host
countries simultaneously. These migration scholars, notably Glick Schiller, Basch,
Szanton-Blanc, Portes et al, closely studied the cases of West-Indian, Mexican, Haitian
and Filipino migrants, and have argued that the state as defined in classical liberal
political theory, is becoming ‘de-territorialized’ as a result of emergent migrant
populations whose ‘lives cut across national boundaries and bring two societies into a
single social field.’ (Glick Schiller, Basch, Szanton-Blanc, 1992: 1) Transnational public
spheres are being formed that stretch the concept and praxis of sovereignty beyond
territory unto discursive grounds. The assumption that there is “an immutable link
between cultures, peoples or identities and specific places, is directly challenged by
migration and the rise of diasporic communities around the world.” (Lavie and
Swedenbourg, 1997:1)
As transnational processes such as the emergence of broad networks to sustain
transnational modes of living and symbolic communities to strengthen shared identity,
are defying the significance of national boundaries, states and scholars are contemplating
in what ways membership in a society should be (re)conceptualized and (re) configured.
What rights and obligations should pertain to transmigrants vis-à-vis states and vice
versa, and what ‘expressions of nationalism’, belonging and identity are catalyzed by
forms of transnationality? (Kastoryano, 2002: 693)
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The case of the Moroccan communities abroad is a perfect example of how
economic, social and cultural networks are formed spanning entire political territories and
bridging the distance between two continents. Large family and communal networks
between Morocco and Europe are spearheading major socio-cultural and political
transformations within Morocco and Europe. In Morocco, the most visible manifestation
of this fact happens during the summer vacation, when about 2 million Moroccans
residing abroad cross the straits of Gibraltar heading south. The phenomenon known in
popular and official discourse as Opération Marahaba is quite unique because of the fact
that the country starts preparing as soon as spring arrives for the annual welcoming of
almost half its nationals living abroad. This phenomenon is what President of the Conseil
de la Communauté Marocaine a l’étranger, Mr. Driss El-Yazami called “ La Paradoxe
Marocaine”. What is paradoxical to him, is that despite the diversity of Moroccans
abroad, in terms of country of residence, migration period and socio-economic status,
most individuals still maintain a close relationship with Morocco while still seeking to
‘integrate’ in their countries of residence. A large segment of Moroccan emigrants, “
have become transnational in so far as they manage to live simultaneously in two
countries, contributing to the nation-building processes of both their countries of origin
and those of immigration.”(Salih, 2003:5)
Transnationalism as a research field materialized as a response to scholarship on
migration that only focused on studying migrants’ positions within host countries;
whether and how they adapt and are in- or excluded. (Vertovec, 2001:574) Departing
from “host-society centered incorporation”, the transnational outlook focused on
“transcending immigrant identities and commitments” that challenge dominant narratives
which argue that adaptation to host-society and transnationality are mutually exclusive
processes. (Bouras, 2010:2) Academic literature on transnational actors and how their
activities alter the nature and functioning of the state, on individual and collective
identities, community consciousness and creation of networks emerged rapidly. However,
there has been a strong tendency to see migrants “as free-floating transnational
communities whose positions and rights are secured by supranational forces and
discourses and whose identities and types of claim are largely independent from the
policies of the receiving and sending countries.” (Glick Schiller, 467) Although some
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argue that transnationalism underlines the freedom of individuals and ‘the tribulations of
the self ’ in an effort to construct an identity for oneself apparently disembedded from
one’s cultural roots”, there is also a clear sign that states have a stake in catalyzing,
shaping or curbing transnationalism. (Giddens, 1991: 187)
Hence, my premise is that we also need to observe how individuals interact with
transnational opportunities and limits, and how debates and contestations surrounding
cultural and religious differences, integration, dual citizenship and loyalty issues in both
home-societies and host-societies, are having an impact upon the way in which
Moroccans can envision and create transnational lives. In this research paper, I present
accounts of “the history and activities of individuals, taking into consideration migrants
own desires, strategies, practices for staying connected around the world and how these
ties differ from before”, as a way of learning about the institutional underpinnings of
transnationalism and its structural effects. (Vertovec, 2001: 573) In placing actor-oriented
approaches against the backdrop of larger structural conditions, I believe we can analyze
the manifestation of motivations, meanings and the place of people as their own agents in
process of change. To understand transnationalism as it occurs within and has impact
upon, the daily lives of individuals and their support networks, I see it as imperative to
analytically include the discursive contexts in which transnational activities and
transnational identities are forged. Reason why I have chosen to study to what extent the
transnational activities and identities of my interviewees are shaped by policy and
political discourses in both The Netherlands in Morocco. How do these two states
separately but simultaneously affect how Moroccan-Dutch citizens form transnational
lives or not? Ultimately, the scope and nature of transnational social spheres are
influenced by the historical circumstances from which they arise and by evolving
discourses and settings. This paper examines how and why transnationalism came to be
perceived as negative in the Netherlands, but is currently placed into a positive light by
the Moroccan state.
My research will be based on an analysis of several academic reports which have
touched on the topic of changing discourses in both the Netherlands and Morocco. It will
be complemented by the narratives of nine individuals comprising of persons who have
migrated to build their lives in the Netherlands, second-generation Moroccans who were
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born there and transmigrants who commute between the Netherlands and Morocco. I will
introduce you to Aziz, Taib, Mohammed, Karim, Hajat, Jia, Mr. N and his son, Mr.
Yousfi. All of these individuals proudly claim their Moroccan roots but they also all
acknowledge that having a Dutch nationality has impacted their lives tremendously.
These individuals have shared their stories with me through in person semistructured interviews individually or in a focus group. Two people spoke to me through
video conference and phone. Some scholars have maintained (i.e Ruba Salih) that
research on transnationalism cannot be accounted for by remaining focused on one single
site of intensive investigation, which is why multi-sited ethnography –which
acknowledges ‘macrotheoretical narratives and concepts of the world system and aims to
follow the circulation of cultural meanings, objects, identities, in diffuse time-space’–has
been suggested as the best mode of research. (Marcus,1995:96) Though I was able to
interview people in both the Netherlands and Morocco, I would have liked to conduct
more extensive and accurate multi-sited ethnographic research. Participant observation
has also been crucial in informing my findings.
In the first chapter of this paper I will look at the emergence of transnationalism
as a research field and how scholarship on transnationalism has developed over the years.
I will also point out in this chapter why I think one should analyze the impact of public
and political discourses on transnationalism. In the second chapter, I will discuss the
migration transitions and national transformations of the Netherlands and Morocco. An
overview on Morocco’s emigration history will be juxtaposed to the Netherlands’
transition to an immigration country. To understand the two countries national discourses
on migration, one must know the development of their migration narratives.
Subsequently, I will present an analysis of the politics of integration and culturalization in
the Netherlands, and the protocols of Moroccan hospitality towards citizens abroad. Last
but not least, I will give the podium to the individuals I have interviewed so that their
perspectives can be heard.
Unfortunately, I encountered some inherent obstacles while trying to complete this
Independent Research Project. First of all, my research subjects were a select group of
people that were decidly hard to find on an average day in Morocco: citizens who have or
have had Moroccan and Dutch citizenship. Preferably I would have conducted more
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ethnographic research, but this was limited by time and place. Luckily, through a contact
from SIT Amsterdam, I was able to interview four gentlemen in the Netherlands during
our short visit. Through the generous help of NIMAR and SSR in Berkane, I was also
able to speak to four people in Morocco. Furthermore, with the help of a friend, I was
able to reach two Dutch-Moroccan females. I only have the stories of 2 women, which is
a reflection of both the gendered nature of migration as the limitation of time I faced. In
terms of language, most of my informants felt comfortable speaking in Dutch, my first
language. Eventhough there were no perceivable inhibitions to communication between
me and the participants, the fact that I could only interview people with a good command
of Dutch or French did narrow my options in Morocco. A lot of work could still be done
to build on this research but I hope to continue this project.

7

Chapter 1

1.1 Why Transnationalism ?
As more international migrants appeared to call two places ‘home’, spreading
cultural, economic, political and social experiences across boundaries, some migration
scholars felt compelled to discard normative assimilation theory as the framework
through which to analyze migration. In 1992, Glick Schiller et al, proposed that “a new
conceptionalization is needed that comes to terms with the experience and consciousness
of new migrant population…composed of those whose networks, activities and patterns
of life encompass both their host and home societies”. (Glick Schiller et al. 1992:1) Since
then, several authors have contributed to the emergence of this new social field. People
have been migrating for ages, so what discerns this new frame of study?
Space, time and the global economy has been dramatically reconfigured in the last
three decades by transnational processes, including migration. What separates
transnationalism from previous migration studies frameworks was that it took into
account novel phenomena based on “high intensity of exchanges, new modes of
transacting, and multiplication of activities that require cross-border travel and contacts
on a sustained basis.” (Portes et al, 1999: ) New technological advances and subsequent
transformation of communication and transportation options have, as Castells argued,
brought about the emergence of ‘the network society’, in which “place is devaluated, but
new social space is created in which meaningful exchanges and routinized interactions in
the dominant structures of society take place.” (Castells 2000 cited by Kivisto, 2003:8)
Hence the reason transnational activities were not in evidence in previous waves of
migration as they are now.
Upon scrutinization of transnationalism as new scholarship, Steven Vertovec
found that one of the conceptual pitfalls of transnationalism, is that the concept is applied
too comprehensively. Transnationalism takes place within almost all arenas, so often a
host of processes and interpretations become mixed up. In Conceiving and researching
transnationalism, Steven Vertovec proposes six conceptual premises upon which to
examine transnationalism: social morphology, type of consciousness, mode of cultural
reproduction, avenue of capital, site of political engagement and (re) construction of
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place and modality. (Vertovec, 1999) Relevant to my research are the propositions of
transnationalism as social morphology, referring to the creation of a social formation
spanning borders in which migrants can maintain contacts with country of origin, and
type of consciousness. I will build on these conceptualizations of transnationalism that
center on “ the multiplicity of involvements that transmigrants sustain in both home and
host societies (...) trans migrants take actions, make decisions, and develop subjectivities
and identities embedded in networks of relationships that connect them simultaneously to
two or more nation-states.”(Schiller et al 1994 cited by de Bree, 2008:8) What binds
people into these social forms and networks, is a common consciousness build on
multiple identities that link people to one or more nation. (Basch et al, 1992:11) This
consciousness of multilocality enables the formation a community of people both ‘here’
and ‘there’ that share the same ‘routes’ and ‘roots’. (Vertovec,1999:450) MoroccanDutch citizens evidently envision themselves as part of an imagined community and get
involved in forms of “solidarity and identity that do not rest on an appropiation of space
where contiguity and face-to-face contact are paramount.” (Ferguson, Gupta, 1992: 9)
Within this engendered transnational social space of Dutch-Moroccans, socio-cultural
enterprises oriented towards the reinforcement of national identity abroad and to
maintenance of individual, family and community ties, are continuously transforming
relationships and means of cultural production. In my interviews with Moroccan-Dutch
respondents I have tried to locate the parameters of this transnational local space, so as to
measure the consequences of these transnational contacts. My questions directed the
respondents to speak about processes such as identification with and belonging to a
country or community, the collective enjoyment of cultural events and goods, the
meaning of having dual citizenship, etc. Their stories also gives us insight on how
individuals are positioning themselves vis-à-vis a dominant discourse that sees
maintenance of transnational links as contradictory and undesirable
Traditional assimilationist theory holds that migrants gradually come to abandon
the cultural practices, language, and values of their home countries, and that successive
generations eventually lose their cultural distinctiveness and become incorporated into
the mainstream society. By interpreting my informants opinions and reactions on the
political and national discourse held in Holland and in Morocco, I want to make
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projections on what directions Moroccan-Dutch transnationalism will take, especially
with the maturing of the second generation. .

1.2 Discursive practices: policy and political discourse
Since language is a vehicle for creating realities, assessment of the way in which social
and psychological circumstances are produced and re-produced in certain discursive
practices, needs to start with an observation of the discourse that has been used to
describe the realities within the supposed transnational field between Morocco and the
Netherlands. I approach the concept of discourse in the Foucauldian sense, by looking at
the politics of meaning: how discourse– as an ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categories
through which meaning is given to social and physical phenomena, and which is
produced and reproduced through an identifiable set of practices– serves to shape
people’s social lives by way of established rules and norms. (www.hajer.nl) The aim of
looking at public and political discourse, is to see how ‘truth’ is socially constructed and
how discourse negotiates who participates and how a participant is to form part of a
discussion. (www.hajer.nl) The events in the public and political arena discussed later in
this paper are no exceptional phenomena, but reflect a pattern of practices. By critically
looking at policy changes, one finds evidence that the crafting of policy is not only about
facts and figures, but about presenting images and meanings that convey power; power
defined as a dynamic of control and lack of control between discourses and the subjects,
constituted by discourses, who are their agents.” (Wheeldon, 1987: 113) Political
discourse shapes policy that a country will conduct and the legislation that it will craft to
impose rights, duties and limitations on immigrants in society since this discourse often
balances normative, descriptive and strategic beliefs on the nature of a problem, frame of
reference through which policy solutions are devised and strategies to achieve policy
aims. (Fermin, 1997:230)
Policy conflicts are thus often the result of discourse coalitions that are battling
each other for the acceptance of their perspectives or frameworks of meanings.
(Fermin,1997:7) One of the features of dominant discourse is the power to interpret
issues, conditions and events. There is power excercised within discourses in the ways in
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which individual subjects are constituted and governed and in the similar ways in which
individual respondents make sense of and react to events. (Weeldon, 1987) As a result,
dominant public and political discourse also has a bearing on the social contruction of
identities as an expression of economic and political links, and on continuing unequal
political and social outputs. (Fermin,1997: 8)
In the case of the Netherlands, supposed changing ‘knowledge’ on minorities
from migrant background has had an tremendous effect on altering the social context in
which certain practices emerge as permissable and desirable. Jan Rath in ‘Minoritization:
social contruction of ethnic minorities’, points out that “the dominant ideologies in the
Netherlands that surround the minority paradigm, have succeeded in attaching meaning to
the contruction of ethnic minorities as a social and cultural collective based on certain
characteristics, such as non-conformity.” (Rath, 1991 cited by Fermin,1997:8) This
minority paradigm builds itself on phenotypical markers of race, religion, culture and
national origin. The construction of migration and the presence of minorities as a
problematic issue–particularly the presence of Moroccans in Dutch society–does not
logically flow as an outcome of immigration or immigrant characteristics, but is a
consequence of the way Dutch society has seen and contructed itself. In the case of
Morocco, the emphasis on ostensible permanent religious and cultural ties and the reality
of permanent citizenship has also determined the way ‘Moroccan-ness’ is conceptualized
and manifested.
Chapter 2: Migration Transitions and National Transformations.

2.1 Contemporary Moroccan migration to Europe
Morocco has long been the labor reservoir for Europe and surrounding areas.
Migration patterns emerged during the pre-protectorate period, as individuals engaged in
seasonal and circular migration to neighbouring Algeria, which was at that time a French
colony. (de Haas, 2007: 5) In succesive decades during the 20th century, migration
continued in waves, with a number of migrants leaving through Algeria to assist the
French army during World War I and II, and to work in mines and factories in France.
(de Haas, 2007: 5) This emigration was quite small compared to the post-war exodus

11

(1962-1972) of people heading to Europe to take jobs in in the steel and mining
industries. The demand for low skilled labourers in rebuilding efforts, propelled the onset
of Moroccan migration to new European destinations such as The Netherlands (1969),
Belgium (1964) and West-Germany (1963), through labor contracts between the
Moroccan kingdom and these West-European countries. In the last two decades, we have
seen the addition of Italy and Spain as host countries of Moroccans, and the amount of
Moroccans residing in these two countries has risen to a significant number.
Although sociological conditions of various waves of migrants make it impossible,
to offer a unique universal explicative theory of migration, Moroccan residence in Europe
has not occurred randomly. The Moroccan state had a strong hand in carving itineraries
from specific places to specific places depending on the region of origin of migrants and
local circumstances. (de Haas, 2005: 9) Some parts of Morocco–such as the berber
speaking Rif region–were notoriously rebellious to the sultan’s commands and
continuously showed their overall discontent with conditions in Morocco. To combat
dissidence, Morocco directed European nations to recruit there. International migration
thus did not take place in a social-economic and political void, it was instrumental in
curbing ethnic and political tensions in the country. Economic and social preconditions
stemming from the legacy of colonialism heavily impacted the direction and nature of
large scale out-migration. (de Haas, 2005:7) The living standards of migrants before
departing also play a role; the duration of migration depends on whether migrants
originate from rural or urban areas, whether the migrant is head of household, literate or
illiterate, since migrants originating from rural area stay twice as long than urban
migrants. (Sadiqi, Ennaji, 64) To understand the spatial organization of Moroccan
residence in Europe it is thus crucial to take historical precedents into account.
Emigration in later decades continued via the paths that had previously been
established as family and community networks emerged linking particular Moroccan
areas to certain European destinations. In fact, “spontaneous settlement and informal
recruitment has been more important numerically.” (de Haas, 2005,:7) In 1976, just 13 %
of Moroccans living in the Netherlands had migrated because they had been offered labor
contracts from the Dutch state; 43 % had migrated through personal contacts, and 24%
through direct recruitment by companies.” (de Haas, 2005:7; Shahid,1979:165)
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Although residence in Europe was inititially meant to be temporary, a majority of
guestwork migrants stayed and were later joined by their families during the period 19731989. (de Haas, 2005:8) The context in which migration took place was significantly
altered by several occurences: the oil crisis of 1973, two failed coup d’etats against King
Hassan II, ensuing political repression in Morocco, and the restriction of immigration by
Western European countries. While migrants themselves, sending country and receiving
countries all assumed that migration would be circular, the reverse happened.
Paradoxically, the recruitment stop and new barriers to enter Europe brought about
permanent settlement and not re-migration. (de Haas, 2005: 8) Permanent migration was
further spurred by family reunification. Family reunification, family formation, natural
increase, undocumented migration and new labour migration combined to bring the
Moroccan population in Europe up to around 3 million individuals. (de Haas, 2007: 7)
The outcome of these consecutive decades of mass departure from Morocco, is that
migration has become deeply “embedded in the repertoire of people’s behaviours, and the
values associated with migration have become part of the community’s values. (Wissen,
van der erf, heering: 325) Currently we still see that especially youngsters still consider
migration as their way out and a key to success in life.

2.2 The Netherlands as an Immigration country
Given the Netherlands’ relative freedom and wealth, it has long been a haven for
migrants and refugees.1 After the Second World War, however, the scope and nature of
immigration changed entirely. With the independence of Indonesia in 1945, large
numbers of Dutch-Indonesian repatriates arrived of whom more than half was Eurasian.2
The other large group from Indonesia were Moluccans who came to the Netherlands
while the Dutch negotiated with Indonesia to allow an independent Moluccan state, but
who were ultimately forced to create a life in the Netherlands as their ideal free republic
remained a fiction. The Dutch colonial empire continued to unravel in the 1970’s, when
Suriname declared its independence in 1975. Anticipating economic and political
instability, a first wave of Surinamese chose to settle in the Netherlands and in 1980 a
http://www.focusmigration.de/typo3_upload/groups/3/focus_Migration_Publikationen/Laenderprofile/CP11_Netherlands.pdf
2 Idem.
1
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second wave arrived prior to the introduction of a mandatory visa.3 With the arrival of
Dutch-Antilleans from the former colonies due to the deteriorating economic situation on
the islands during the rest of the 80’s, Dutch society saw a large trasnformation.
It is in this context that Moroccan migrants arrived to the Netherlands. Like other
European countries at that time, the Netherlands was still welcoming and actively
recruiting post-war immigrants, as there was dire need for cheap labor to boost economic
growth and to contribute to the rebuilding efforts. Following France and Belgium, the
Dutch government signed a recruitment agreement with Morocco, Turkey, the former
Yugoslavia and Southern European countries in 1969.4 At the same time that
guestworkers from Spain and Portugal were remigrating back to their countries when
these joined the EU, the Moroccan (and Turkish) population in the Netherlands was
rapidly increasing due to family reunification, family formation and childbirth. The
process of family reunification was initially opposed because of an existing housing
crisis, but later family reunification regulations were loosened.5 Currently immigrants and
their direct descendants constitute almost 20% of the total population, and in the big
cities the percentage can reach up to half. There are about 349.000 Moroccans in the
Netherlands, of which 167.305 are first generation Moroccans and 181.700 are second
generation Moroccans. (www.cbs.nl) There are approximately 681 Moroccan
organizations in the Netherlands and they consist predominantly of religious
organizations. (approximately 171, or about 25%)6

Chapter 3: National policies, political discourses and citizenship issues

3.1 Morocco and state-sponsored transnationalism
That the management of emigration– and the impact of emigration– can be on the daily
agenda of many states is often ignored by discourse on migration management. (Gamlen,
2006:3) In scholarship, there is often the assumption that ‘diasporic management policies
cluster around geopolitical peripheries’ and that “states using diasporic policies are poor:

3

Idem.

4

Idem

Idem
6 http://www.scp.nl/dsresource?objectid=20909&type=org

5
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responding to inferior positions in an asymmetrical world system”. (Gamlen, 2006:3)
Diasporic management discourse is quite varied and a typology has yet to be developed
in order to perform comparative research on the way states choose to interact with their
citizens abroad. On the one hand it is suggested that “diaporic engagement policies
should not be seen as part of a unitary, coordinated state strategy”, thus the vacillitation
to use the term ‘policy’. (Gamlen, 2006:4) The second argument, is that “whether as state
strategy or not, diaspora engagement policies (re)produce citizen-sovereign relationships’
and inherently transnationalize governmentality.” (Gamlen, 2006: 5) According to
Gamlen, Foucault’s typology of power mechanisms, provides a good yardstick to gauge
in which ways states are seeking to exercise control over their emigrant communities. On
the one hand, ‘there is institution building that puts into place the “objective capacities”
that make possible the exercise of power, while symbolic nation-building establishes a
“relationship of communication”. (Gamlen, 2006, 6) The capacity of a country of origin
to engage in diasporic management policies is first and foremost contingent on the
existence of an “imagined or discursive cohesive transnational community, founded on
the notion of a common national identity towards which policies can be directed.”
(Gamlen, 2006:6) There are various ways through which states can connect with their
communities abroad, i.e by actively mobilizing expatriates to advance interests,
organizing conferences and conventions, educational programmes on home-state
language and culture, celebration of national holidays and cultural events abroad. In this
way, states have a influential hand in forging transnational public spheres and producing
‘communal mentalities’ and shared identities linked to the homeland. To create a
governable community, discourse on belonging is essential. (Gamlen, 2006:7)
From the beginning of mass-scale emigration to Europe, the kingdom of Morocco
send a clear message to its departing subjects to remain primarily committed to their
country of birth. The political establishment after independence spurred on and facilitated
emigration with the prospect of cultivating the experiences of nationals abroad and
reaping economic benefits. (de Haas, 2007: 4) Yet, because of fear of political opposition
from abroad, the Moroccan government severely condemned active political participation
in host-society. To keep abreast on developments, it funded spying associations in
friendly disguise known as ‘Les Amicales.’ The late King Hassan II also made direct
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attempts to instruct citizens abroad. In the 1986 local elections in the Netherlands, he
called for Moroccan citizens not to participate. (Bouras, 2010:21) In this regard the King
made a clear statement that it opposed ‘adaptation’ to the Netherlands.
What’s interesting in the last two decades, however, is that ‘the nature of links’
between Moroccan individuals residing elsewhere and the state has shifted from one of
control, towards active courtships in order to conserve a bond. (de Haas, 2007:4) This
somewhat drastic change was a result of the realization on behalf of the Moroccan
authorities that their emigrants were increasingly perceiving that the Moroccan state only
had an eye out for their remittances. (de Haas, 2007:3) As such the relationship of
Morocco with its citizens abroad did not start off too positively. The Moroccan state had
expectations that a relationship with its emigrants would bring back new ‘ideas, attitudes,
skills’ and that these individuals would be development actors. (de Haas, 2007:13) This
expectation was not fulfilled; more structural changes were needed before involvement in
terms of investment could be possible and the transfer of knowledge was ignored
altogether. Paradoxically, the state did succeed in receiving a growing amount of
remittances every year, and to keep this up it supported the building of networks of
consulates, post offices and bank branches abroad and in Morocco. (de Haas, 2007:13)
The state recorded an increase from $23 million in 1968 to $2 billion in 1990 in
remittances, and in 1991 remittances represented 84.5 percent of the total amount of
foreign investments, development aid, and private loans received by the country. (De
Haas 2003)
By establishing several government offices next, such as Le Ministère de
l’Émigration and Le Ministère chargé de la Communauté Marocaine à l'Étranger and
other institutions, the Moroccan state continued to strengthen lines of communication. In
1990, King Hassan II established Le Fondation Hassan II pour les Marocains Résidant à
l’etranger, an institution dedicated to helping Moroccans who reside abroad to overcome
difficulties they were facing as a result of their emigration. It was a first mayor
foundation to solely focus on further developing fundamental ties with individuals
abroad. The organization is subdivided in several teams (education, cultural exchange,
sport & youth, research) in order to provide a variety of services. A target group is
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Moroccans in precarious living conditions; the organization provides legal advise and
support to individuals, even with issues specifically related to the country of residence.
Through Opération Marahaba, Morocco has labored to make transportation facilities
better and entrance procedures flexiber, and has consequently been succesful in
stimulating annual visits of its migrants back to Morocco as tourists. The state has also
facilitated that residents abroad can follow Moroccan developments from the comfort of
their homes with the establishment of public satellite channels, such as Al Maghribia
(“the Moroccan”), a public satellite channel started in the early 2000’s with programs
presented in Arabic, French, and Tamazight (Berber). They often have programs
especially dedicated to citizens abroad. (de Haas, 2007: 25)
In December 2007, King Mohammed VI produced a Royal Dahir in which he sets
up Le Conseil Consultative de la Communauté Marocaine a l’étranger or Council for the
Moroccan community Abroad, known as CCME. This ‘transnational’ consultative
organization, was brought to life to assess how to best capitalize on the relationship with
the different communities abroad. In the Royal Decree creating CCME, his mayesty
dictates that:
“the kingdom has always attached the utmost importance to ensuring that Moroccan
nationals, wherever they may be, exercise all rights and obligations inherent in their citizenship,”
and that “in keeping with the kingdom’s commitment to enhance the strong ties binding its
citizens, an efficient institution with the ability to perform different tasks such as to conduct
consultations and to help shape policies related to immigration and Moroccan expatriates afairs
will be created.”

The Council shall have a mandate to give its opinion on basic trends and general
policies aimed at enabling Moroccan expatriates to remain committed to their Moroccan
identity, encouraging Moroccan expatriates to join institutions get involved in various
areas of national activity. Although the name of the Council speaks of ‘a community’
abroad, the President of the Council personally clarified that as a first step, the Council is
actually trying to increase awareness that there are Moroccan communities abroad.
In the comparative research of various countries diasporic engagement policies
assembled by Gamlen, Morocco seems to be quite far along in terms of symbolic
capacity building and institution building. The state grants nationals abroad civil and
social rights (some welfare protection and tourism services), and is considering
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complementing these with extensive political rights since various scholars in migration
research have argued that complete membership in home-society have a positive impact
on transnational activity. (Itzigsohn 2000, Goldring 1998 cited by Gamlen, 2006:10)
Morocco’s specific diaspora engagement policies have been quite succesful because they
have also been instituted with more general political and economic reforms, which
have improved civil liberties and secured more macro-economic stability. (de Haas,
2007:48)

3.2 The king’s faithful subjects
Following Foucault’s classification, Gamlen asserts that “if institution building
aims to contruct objective capacities to realize relations of power, and symbolic nationbuilding policies aim to produce a relationship of communication, the extension of rights
and the extraction of obligations– the transnationalization of citizenship– constitutes
‘finalized activities’, or ‘specific effects’ of the exercise of power.” (Foucault 1982 cited
by Gamlen, 2006: 10) One of the ways in which Morocco has been succesful in
‘exporting its sovereignty abroad’ is through its citizenship policy. The Moroccan
nationality cannot be discarded and is unquestionably transferred generationally. The
national ideology embraces the king’s role as the uncontested ‘Commander of the
Faithful’ and addresses all people of Moroccan descent as subjects. In fact, by not
allowing the renunciation of citizenship, the Kingdom claims loyalty to God, country and
the King. (Bouras, 2010:11) The kingdom ipso facto uses ‘subject-making’ procedures
that precede legal residence, and surpasses naturalized citizenship based on the civic
model.” (Ong 1996; Hardt and Negri 2000 cited by Gamlen, 2006:11)
During the anniversary of the 32nd Green March Day, His Mayesty Mohammed VI
affirmed the following in his official speech;
“The democratic, development-oriented process I am spearheading requires the participation of
all Moroccans, wherever they may be, in a spirit of strong commitment to our national identity
and to responsible citizenship. My regular field visits and my tireless efforts to make sure my
citizens at home enjoy a dignified life are equaled only by the special importance I attach to the
conditions of our beloved fellow citizens who live abroad. I am keen to help them fulfill their
legitimate aspirations and to strengthen the bonds they have with the homeland, especially family
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bonds and spiritual and cultural ties. A gradual, comprehensive approach will be adopted to
ensure their full-fledged, democratic participation in all aspects of public life, and to defend their
rights and dignity in their host country.“

The official discourse of Morocco conveys that its borders lie where its citizens
are. This ideology of inalienability of citizenship is built, as heard in the His Mayesty’s
speech, on cultural, religious and personal domains. This is not just the opinion of the
political elite, most people in Morocco share this presumption. Although there has been
increasing talk on what it means to be a (good) Moroccan, and what should be conditions
for citizenship, there are very few voices proposing a different scenario. Related to the
matter of foreign-born Moroccans, scholars in transnational research have often
wondered if transnational processes will continue with the second generation or if they
will wither away. Well aware of this threatening possibility, the Moroccan state has
appointed the CCME with the task to explore the best way to reach out to secondgeneration Moroccans. In a first attempt to realize this objective, the CCME organized
the first Forum of Moroccan Youths of the World in July of this year. In the press release
for the forum, the Council mentions “from now onward, the Moroccan young generations
abroad, mainly in the old immigration countries such as France, Belgium, and The
Netherlands, are likely to hold important positions among all Moroccans in the world.”
(www.CCME.ma.org) The purpose of the forum was to better know “the young
generations of Moroccans with their plural life and aspirations –explicitly mentioning
mixed marriages as one of the factors making matters more complex- in order to assess
what realistic and concrete policies can be proposed to help Moroccan youth living
overseas to establish a strong relationship at the institutional, social and cultural level.”
(www.CCME.ma.org) The forum was set up as a platform for an exchange of ideas, to
provide space to assess the diversity of skills and to facilitate an exchange of expertise
and experiences among Moroccan youths active in different fields locally and globally. It
was also organized to inform, “what the criteria and fields are that would enable Morocco
(both at the level of government and civil society) to positively intervene while taking
into consideration the question of dual belonging of the young generations.” (www.
CCME.ma.org) The press release also includes the powerful statement that ”no country
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can give up its youth even if they live out of its borders and are naturalized”. Although
this statement fits into Morocco’s discourse on sovereignty, it basically ignores the
opinions and desires of foreign born Moroccan youth on whether they would like to
engage with the country there parents were born in or not. When it comes to the secondand third generations, de Haas argues that ‘transnationalized citizenship’ can result in
conflicting sovereignty claims. (de Haas, 2007) This in part has been the case with
second generation Moroccan Dutch nationals. In 2004, the Dutch government requested
Morocco to stop the automatic transfer of citizenship, and in 2005 the request was
reformulated requesting that 3rd generation Moroccans be enabled to renounce Moroccan
citizenship. Both requests were refused by the Moroccan state. (de Haas, 2007:46)
The phenomenon of Islam as a transnational public space is one that encompasses
migration but also extends beyond it. Bowen argues that “transnational Islam creates and
implies the existence and legitimacy of a global public space of normative reference and
debate, and that this public space cannot be reduced to a dimension of migration or of
transnational religious movements.”(Bowen, 2004:879) The Moroccan state has had its
own way of transnationalizing Islam. It has been working through the Ministry of Islamic
Affairs and through the Fondation Hassan II to answer the needs of Moroccans abroad
and of securing that Moroccans residing outside of the national borders maintain their
Maliki roots and do not turn to fanaticism and extremism. It has done so through the
sending of money and imams, and continues to train imams abroad. In her research on
Moroccan women and transnationalism, Ruba Salih, finds that Islam is not the
universalist project its presented as, neither can it be clearly separated from the private
sphere. (Salih, 2003:145) Islam is a political and public subject of discussion which
opposes several constituencies in several countries.

3.3 The evolution of Dutch minority policy
Due to the global economic enterprises of the previous Dutch empires, the
country was open very early to outside influences, and many people see the Dutch
standard of tolerance as stemming from this historical necessity to accommodate various
ideologies, religions, cultures and ways of living. To circumvent clashes and to ensure the
collective well being of the country, the Dutch resorted to the model of pillarization,
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which organized society ‘vertically’ into different segments (or groups), notably The
Catholics, Protestants, Socialists and Liberals. Individuals converged around the
ideological pillar of their choice, and had access to their own institutions, organizations,
schools, media outlets and trade unions. As such “class-based and religious cleavages”
were bridged through a system of politics by accommodation, using concessions and
compromise to reach agreements.7 Starting the 1960’s the situation changed rapidly as
society integrated as a result of growing secularization and as other political and social
orientations emerged. Nevertheless, given the appeared succes of this vertical structuring
of society based on a mosaic vision of convivance, ‘pillarization’ served as the blueprint
for the ethnic minority and ‘integration’ policy to be devised later on. Not surprisingly
then, the Dutch went on to endorse the multiculturalist project, since it in many ways
resembled the pillarist approach. (Scholten, Holzhacker, 2009: 82)
The first versions of minority policy designed by the Dutch government in the
early 1980’s encouraged new immigrant groups to maintain their own cultures, to start
their own organizations, media outlets and places of worship; practically to start their
own pillar. Additionally, government financing was provided to ensure educational
provisions according to language and culture. (Vasta, 2006:5) Both political consensus
and scientific research supported the notion that to aid the emancipation of ethnic
minorities and increase individual socio-economic participation, group structures and
cultural identity formation had to be supported. (Scholten, Holzhacker 2009: 82) Via the
policy of “Onderwijs in Eigen Taal and Cultuur”, the government financed Islamic
schooling in Arabic for the children of Muslim guestworkers. As Nadia Bouras mentions
in her paper, “ shifting meanings of transnationalism: analysing academic and political
discourse on contacts, with a case study on Moroccan migrants in the Netherlands (19652000), one of the Dutch government’s central policies in the 70’s was to subsidize
organizations of ethnic minorities. (Bouras, 2010:18) This was the result of a genuine
belief in the multicultural trajectory at that time, but it was also because it was thought
that organizations of migrants would better know their own concerns. The Netherlands
embraced the pluralist perspective and the idea that by “maintaining group- specific
facilities, the social and cultural emancipation of groups would be enhanced which would
7
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benefit individual social and economic participation.” (Bouras, 2010:19) This way the
government could also hold “communities responsible for the acts of individuals”.
(Proceedings Lower House through Bouras, 2010:19) The outcome was that these
organizations –acting as middle man between state and individual–,’ served to strengthen
ethnic and cultural identity and group integrity. (Vasta, 2006:5)
Soon the size of migration flows as the nature and diversity of these flows
called for more reflection on the Netherlands as an immigration country. In 1979, the
Scientific Council of Government Policy advised that it was about time the Netherlands
instituted policy that dealt with the permanent settlement of these migrants. The result
was the formulation of the Ethnic Minorities Policy of 1983, which led to the
implementation of several legal- political, socio-economic, and cultural policies with the
aim of conceding equal rights to ethnic groups. A new citizenship law was passed in
1985– replacing the old one of 1892– that facilitated granting Dutch-born children of
migrants between the ages of 18-25 citizenship. Having flexibler naturalization
procedures was a deliberate policy of the government to level the playing field, and to
subsequently reach better ‘integration’.8 Labour market programmes, special training
courses and education programmes were all developed to bring minority groups up to par
in terms of access to jobs and education. (Vasta, 2006:6) Significant consideration was
also given to Islam as a new force of influence. There was awareness that the
‘institutional framework of immigrants differed from the customary organisation of
church-state separation. The Dutch state still insisted on not intervening in religious
affairs, but proposed to increase the training of imams in the Netherlands.
Still, ten years later indications were that these aims had not been achieved;
minorities’ labour market performance trailed behind ‘natives’, educational achievement
was poor and socio-spatial segregation threatened to become the norm. Attention in the
1990’s suddenly shifted to stressing the individual responsibility to “familiarize with
Dutch language, culture and society”. (Vasta, 2006:7) The 1998 Civic Integration of
Minorities Act made this trend compulsory. The diversion from previous approaches was
quite radical. Individuals from minority groups had to learn Dutch or face possible
sanctions, and would have to turn to mainstream– no longer ‘ethno-specific’ – services.
8
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(Vasta, 2006:7) After the millenium, the parameters of political and public debate
changed entirely as a consequence of local and global events. Rising public dissaproval
of what appeared to be the failure of individuals of minority background to find their way
in Dutch society gave the political establishment leaning to the right a license to drive an
anti-immigrant and anti-asylum agenda. The Netherlands became the first country to
demand immigrants to pass a pre-arrival Civic Integration test (Preparation Abroad) , in
which they test prospective newcomers on knowledge of Dutch language and culture.
(Alternative voices, 2010:56) More recently, it has increased the income and age
requirements in a deliberate attempt to restrain migration, specifically family formation
trends under the second generation. This trend is seen as undermining all efforts. The
Netherlands reversal on immigration and minority policy might be the most dramatic in
the EU, and it is both acknowledged and resisted by Moroccan-Dutch citizens.

3.4 The Politics of integration and the culturalization of citizenship
For long the perception was that given the Netherlands’ experience with
consensual politics, institutional structures were already in place to accommodate
minorities. As immigration from different parts of the globe to the Netherlands continued,
and as families of guest workers became more visible in Dutch society as a result of
family reunification procedures, the public became more aware of the permanent
presence of the immigrants they had previously viewed as temporary visitors. Concerns
arose on how to maximize benefits of immigration both for Dutch society and the
newcomers themselves. (Scientific Council for government policy, 2001:5) Attention
suddenly turned to these ‘ethnic’9 minorities, their position within society and what to do
with the changing national makeup. As soon as it became clear that the Dutch socioethnic landscape had permanently changed, it was not long before ‘the immigration issue’
became politicized in the public and political arena.
One of the key people to bring the ‘integration’ debate to the forefront of political
concerns at the beginning of the ‘90’s was VVD- leader Frits Bolkestein. In fact, he
would have a heavy hand in framing what integration would come to mean in the
following decades. To clarify, the term integration as used by the Dutch should not be
9Dutch

policies use ‘ethnic’qualifications to classify minority data, i.e Western/ non-Western
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confused with integration “referring to the process of mutual accomodation between
majority and minority groups.” (Rodríguez García 2006). In actuality what is implied in
the Netherlands is assimilation (or acculturation), and it is precisly this notion of
assimilating to majority culture, that Bolkestein raised in 1991. In an article in one of the
most widespread read newspapers De Volkskrant he wrote that ‘integration of minorities
must be tackled strongly’.10 He was very crtitical of the policies enacted during the
previous decade, which he saw as “too liberal and too culturally relativistic”.
(Fermin,1997:1) He expressed that migrants should no longer focus on keeping their
identity, but on ‘integrating’ into larger society. He was also among the first to explicitly
mentions Islam as a potential threat to social cohesion and to European fundamentals of
society. Though previously other politicians (Ruud Lubbers in 1990) hinted at a different
approach to minority policies, it was Bolkestein’s invitation to have an open debate on
integration that was accepted by other political parties. Political consensus of the 80’s
that supported multiculturalism, appeared a thing of the past. In the end of the 1990’s,
public discourse became more inflammatory. Well known journalist Paul Scheffer gained
everyone’s attention with his book ‘the multicultural drama’, in which he claims that the
Dutch have been to generous towards immigrants by not insisting that they learn Dutch
language, culture and history. (Vasta, 2006:1)
The most influential political rhetoric on the issue of integration however, came
from Pim Fortuyn. During his run for elections in 2002, he launched an effective
offensive against liberal policies that had not led to ‘integration’and propagated the
argument that Islam was an obstacle in the path towards ‘integration’. His statements
further molded public consciousness towards the idea that that there was huge problem
with ‘integration’, that social cohesion was severly threatened and that a clash of
civilizations was imminent. (Scholten, Holzhacker, 2009: 82) Pim Fortuyn’s murder
shocked Dutch society profoundly. Two years later, the killing of filmmaker Theo van
Gogh, this time by a Dutch-Moroccan Islamic radical, caused another mayor societal
upheaval.
Subsequent the murders of Fortuyn and Van Gogh, discursive developments went
on to suggest ways of “conceiving of immigration, integration, and security that were
10
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radically new for the Netherlands — a difference that far-right populist politicians like
Wilders and Rita Verdonk repeatedly emphasized in terms of ―honesty.” (Hajer,
Versteeg, 2009:3) Directly after the murder, Integration Minister Rita Verdonk placed the
violent acts of the killer Mohammed B. into the cadre of Islam, framing the religion as
backward and violent. (Hajer,Versteeg, 2009:3) At present, there is a continuation of this
anti-immigrant, anti-Islam and pro- nationalist trend by Geert Wilders and his populist
Party of Freedom. Following victory in municipal elections in March 2010, he declared
“We’re going to take the Netherlands back from the leftist elite that coddles criminals and
supports Islamisation (and) still believes in multiculturalism.” ( Hajer, Versteeg, 2009:3)
Wilders has advocated for a complete halt to immigration from Muslim countries,
stopping the building of mosques and deportation of criminal youths with dual
nationality.’ (Alternative voices, 2010:52)
The change in discourse on migrants and minorities over these last two
decades, represents the surge of dominant normativity that is seeking for cultural
explanations for the marginalized situation of minorities. The hegemonic image that is
influencing the national mindset is that the ideal society is homogeneous, so that the
presence of minority groups and diversity itself is problematized and abnormalized.
(Fermin, 1997: 8) Consequently, the perception of an increasing “uncomfortable”
diversity has lead to growing mistrust and even outright hostility towards minorities in
the Netherlands. Even though reports show that integration has been relatively succesful,
and is improving for many groups, certain discourses and policies create a different idea
and undermines the efforts of immigrants to feel as if they belong. Popular debates
stereotype Moroccan youth as the perpetrators of crime and the media’s use of racialized
terms has added fuel to the fire. (Alternative voices, 2010: 56) Eventhough youth
involved in criminal activities are often born in the Netherlands, in media publications
they are only referred to as Moroccans. As a result, many people in the Netherlands still
see Dutch-born youth from immigrant heritage as outsiders. (Alternative Voices,
2010:56) Dutch society largely perceives that Moroccans fail to integrate because they
are unwilling to let go of their ethnic identity. (Emma van den Hout, 2006: 2) It is true
that most Moroccan immigrants and their offspring self-consciously preserve a distinct
identity. But scientific evidence has also shown that non-acceptance and/or social
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exclusion from larger population and social institutions can push individuals to do so.
(Vasta, 2006:18)
Even before research on transnationalism commenced, scholarship on Moroccan
presence in Dutch society brought to the fore the troublesome aspects of their residence
in the Netherlands. Several Dutch authors that studied Moroccan migrants referred to
‘social and financial commitments towards families left behind in Morocco’ and the
resulting position between ‘two worlds’ as a barrier to assimilation. (Bouras, 2010:3)
Dutch politicians are becoming more and more critical of transnational links with home
country. Last year, the Minister of Integration wrote in his Integration Memorandum that
it “gives him ‘an uneasy feeling’ when Moroccans and Turks live in rented houses in
disadvantaged neighbourhoods, while they own houses in their countries of origin.”
(Trouw, 14 November 2009 cited by Bouras, 2010: 30) According to Bouras, the implicit
message is that migrants and their children should choose for the country they settled in”.
(Bouras, 2010:2)
Whereas conventional definitions of citizenship primarily rests on membership in a
political community, there is increasing tendencies in several European states, including
the Netherlands, to accentuate cultural particularities as a precondition to citizenship.
Growing importance is attributed to recognition of national and cultural heritage, loyalty,
language and feeling at home. There is significant contestation of dual nationality, which
de facto relates to transnationalism. This coincides with Kastoryano’s reasoning In
Citizenship, Nationhood, and Non-Territoriality: Transnational Participation in Europe,
that despite dual citizenship and the encouragement of transnational activity by the very
nature of the European Union, the demand for “equal recognition as citizens remains
within the framework of the legitimacy of the state of residence and citizenship.”
(Kastoryano, 2005: 693) As we have seen in the Netherlands, legitimacy is increasingly
shifting in support of cultural arguments. This cultural framing of migrants tells us more
about the Netherlands ‘self-conception’, than about the migrants within its borders.
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Chapter 4: Transnationality at the crossroads: perspectives from the Netherlands and
Morocco
The lives of migrants engaged in transnationalism are defined by complexity and
multiplicity. This compexity arises as they try to make sense of their own presence in
Dutch society, their connection with Morocco and Moroccans worldwide, but also as a
result of discourses that surrounds them. By questioning my participants on several topics
I tried to see whether their identities and activities transcend their place of residence to
include their place of descendence. At the suggestion of Appadurai, the emphasis will be
on the ‘lived local experience’ of my interviewees, since it is not the flow of different
things that is significant, but the meaning that is attached to them by the people.

4.1 The individuals: Between Agadir and Amsterdam
On a chilly Friday night in October, I met my first interviewees in West-Amsterdam.
They were four Moroccan friends from Agadir, by the names of Aziz, Karim,
Mohammed and Taib.
Aziz was born in Agadir and lived in Morocco until he finished high school at 20.
In 1984, he left for France and stayed there for 4 months. He went to the Netherlands on a
trip from Brussels with fellow students, and there is where he has been residing ever
since. He stayed because his visa didn’t allow him to continue to Germany or
Scandinavia, where he ultimately wanted to go to work in the hotel business. Once in the
Netherlands, he went to work in the flower industry, where a lot of other migrants were
working.
Mohammed first left for Tunisia in 1991. During that period people were
emigrating more eagerly. After being denied a visa for France twice, he took another path
through Tunisia, Czech Republic, Germany until he got to France, where his two brother
were living. A short stop in the Netherlands to visit friends turned into his end stop. After
two weeks in Amsterdam, his friends helped him get a job in the restaurant industry.
After 1 year, he married a Dutch woman and now he has two kids.
Taib packed up and left abruptly to France when he was 30, but he did not spend
much time there. He soon met a Dutch woman and moved to the Netherlands to live with
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her and to study electrical engineering. Although their union did not work out, he stayed
there.
Karim had initially left for France, with a plan to later visit a friend in Germany.
Like with the others, the Netherlands was not the end choice at the onset. After 2 weeks
in France and 3 weeks in Germany, he got a visa to the Netherlands. In less than a year,
he met his future wife.
The only two women I was able to interview were Hajat and Jia. Hajat is the
neighbour of one of my best friends, who I had met once this past summer. She is 25,
works in a clothing store and has lived all her life in The Netherlands. Her parents’ roots
are in Tanger, a place she knows through stories and family vacations.
Jia is the girlfriend of a friend of mine, who I only got to speak to through phone for a
couple of questions. Her parents live are commuters between Marrakech and the
Netherlands, so Jia visits at least once a year.
During a two day visit in Berkane I got in contact with Mr. Yousfi, and Mr. N and
his son M. through SSR, a Dutch organization that aids remigrants with legal issues. Mr.
Yousfi was born in Algeria in the 1950’s. When he was younger he used to work as the
driver of the ‘qaid’, a prestigious job for his age at that time. He first moved to Paris and
later received French nationality. He started a relationship with a Dutch woman and
moved to the Netherlands. He remigrated back to Morocco about two years ago with his
Dutch wife, but all his children still live in the Netherlands. Mr. N. moved to the
Netherlands at the request of friends and ended up spending twenty years there, he has
two children in the Netherlands. I had a chance to speak to his son who was in Berkane to
celebrate Eid-El Kebir with the family.

4.2 Identity, Belonging and Culture
It was interesting to see the different answers of my informants when describing
themselves as having a Moroccan, Dutch or Moroccan-Dutch identity. Aziz, Karim,
Mohammed and Taib primarily described themselves as being Moroccan. They were
born and raised in Morocco and all came to the Netherlands at an older age, so that has
had an impact on their lived experience. I also think the siting of the interview played a
large role. Vis-à-vis the rest of the Dutch community, their Moroccan identity stands out.
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The case would have been different had they had been in Morocco maybe. This explains
why Mr. Yousfi, for example, fully embraced being Dutch even though he is a remigrant.
Mr. N on the other hand stated that he feels equally Dutch and Moroccan: “I lived
there for 20 years. I learned so much there, I grew so much there, so the relationship
stays. I feel at home there too”. The three respondents that were born in the Netherlands,
Hajat, Jia and Mr. N’s son also all called themselves Moroccan-Dutch. Mr. N’s son, who
was on vacation in Berkane for Eid, added that “I have received fundamental life values
from both Dutch society as from my Moroccan background, I am not one without the
other”. Jia explicated that she still feels very close to Moroccan culture which makes her
feel Moroccan.
As Ruba Salih suggested in her book, Gender in Transnationalism (2003), it is
important to understand how ‘shared cultural or social identities are contructed and
decontructed by migrants themselves’. Identity for my respondents seems to be equated
with something you feel inside or something that others attach to you. Under identity is
mainly understood, a way of being that relates to your environments, to practices you
adhere to and to particular beliefs you may have. Mohammed for example mentions that
he has observed certain characteristics of Dutch conduct and has always thought to
himself “that doesn’t go with me, that is not for me”. In the same way he believes that
“there are elements of Moroccan culture that will not leave me”. When I asked him for
examples, he gave the example of hospitality, of respect for elders and family. So
difference from ‘others’play a role in identification but so is choice of cultural and social
activities. The three second-generation Moroccans I interviewed see the gap between
being Dutch and Moroccan as really large, but they are neither just one or the other. In
order to include all aspects of their lives, they see the need for a dual identification with
an imaginable transnational community. To sum up, the identity of an individual that has
migrated is subjective and flux, affected by generation, coming of age, sense of belonging
and history of interaction with host society. If a person’s identity is often derived from
membership in a social, ethnic, religious or cultural group and from the emotional
significance invested in this membership, migrants and their descendants often have
multiple identities or plural allegainces to different groups; they engage in processes of
seeking collectivity and inclusion into different communities through indirect or direct
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participation.
Eventhough these subjects were are living in the Netherlands, what people would
think about them in Morocco was never far of their minds. Taib speaks about how he has
struggled with that. “That notion of worrying about what people think of you and what
they are going to say is something that is part of the Moroccan mentality”. People that
have migrated or come form migrant background could also see themselves as part of a
‘transnational communities on the basis of a shared history, traditions and values.
(Kivisto, 2003: 14) Identities are seen to be generated in, and constructed through, a kind
of internal (self-attributed ) and external (other-ascribed) dialectic conditioned within
specific social worlds. This holds for both personal and collective identities, which
should be understood as always closely entangled with each other (Vertovec, 2001:577)
At times of cultural events and special holidays, that is when most people felt like
they were closes to their Moroccan identity. All of the gentlemen I interviewed agreed
that the celebrations of specific holidays was very different living in the Netherlands than
in Morocco. Aziz shares that “When I went back after 26 years during Ramadan, I was
surprised at the atmosphere, the sharing, people all eating at the same time, and then is
when I realized how different it is to celebrate in The Netherlands.” According to Karim
it is harder to follow the prescriptions, he joked on how he constantly has to repeat that he
is doing Ramadan to his colleagues offering coffee. Aziz invoked how people ask him
jokingly about how his ‘hunger strike” is going. Mohammed said that the experience has
drastically improved, however, and that they can increasingly approximate the ‘authentic
experience’, the one they would presumably have in Morocco. “Before you had to look
hard to find the right butcher, and stand in line. Now I don’t have to make special
arrangement to find a sheep”, said Mohammed.These occurrences also have an effect on
people sense of belonging.
When I asked my participants about when they started to feel at ‘home’ in the
Netherlands, all men were quick to point how complex it actually is to label one place
home. Aziz tells me that he believes he started feeling at ‘home’ when he achieved some
personal milestones: “When I had a family life of my own, that’s when I started feeling at
home. My relationship, my children, they make me feel at home. You get it suddenly, you
don’t notice when it happens but it comes to you.” Karim reiterated that thought: “All of
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sudden you realize it. For example, you are driving back from Germany and you see the
border sign that says the Netherlands, and without reflection you that relief associated
with arriving home. And that’s when you say, Oh, I feel at home there! It takes a long
time before you get that feeling”. Trying to feel at home is not something they made an
effort to do.
Mohammed mentions that when he arrived his thoughts were only on his mission
of making a living in Europe and on achieving stability first. He did say that he started
feeling more at ease in The Netherlands when he accomplished some personal and
professional goals. This pressure to achieve a level of success was also an outcome of
transnational concerns; primarily the concern of helping your family. Karim painted a
clear picture: “It is as if you are a tree and you plant yourself somewhere. You have to
cultivate yourself and wait a couple of years until you start growing. When you ultimately
feel as if you are well planted and you can bear fruit, then you have to start sharing the
fruits with your family back in Morocco.” This is a great example of how belonging is
mediated between discourses, institutions and subjects (Davids and van driel cited by de
Bree, 48 2005:5) Karim, for example, started to feel at home after approximately 5 years;
“When you speak the language, you understand people and then you can defend
yourself.” The identities of my respondents play out and position them in the course of
their everyday lives within and across each of their places of attachment or perceived
belonging, since their feelings of belonging are non-static and non-fixed.

4.3 Transnational contacts: the role of friends and families
Except for Aziz and Mr.Yousfi, all other men who migrated knew a friend or a family
member in Europe. Karim stated that, “You go where your friends are”, so going to
Europe had been a certainty for him. Having a network that could provide moral support
while preparing for the journey was important, but it was especially on arrival in the
country of destination, in this case The Netherlands. Karim arrived in Amsterdam around
the same time as Taib did and they became close friends;“We were lucky to find each
other” they shared. Aziz mentions that, “We make friends among us. If you tell them you
have just arrived, people will give you information or money; there was plenty of
support. My experience is that after when you want to give back people will tell you to
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pass it on.” Mohammed also said that it was crucial knowing people with paperwork that
were able to help him. The existence of networks creates a transnational public sphere
that connects individuals in Morocco with Moroccans abroad, but also that binds
Moroccans residing in the same country. The importance of family also has a role in
maintaining transnational links with Morocco.“Keeping a relationship with your mother
in Morocco is a must,” expresses Taib. In his opinion, this is contrarily to the Dutch who
do not feel the need to place family at the core of their lives. The responsibility to keep
family links influences the decision of my Moroccan-Dutch interviewees in the
Netherlands, to visit Morocco as often as possible.
However, Technological advances are changing the way individuals connect with
people in their network. Aziz says that“A couple of years ago, I couldn’t reach my
mother. I had to call a shop or a butcher in Morocco. That message would take perhaps
a day or two to reach her. Now, I pick up my phone and in two minutes I have her on the
line and I can speak to her for hours. We can even speak about what was on tv
yesterday.”A better example could not have been given to illustrate how mass
international communication has transformed the meaning of place. The basis for the
emergence of transnationalism on a mass scale, was availability of air transport, long
distance telephone, fax, electronic mail form. “The greater the access of an immigrant
group to space-and time compressing technology, the greater the frequency and scope of
transnational activity. “ (Glick Schiller et al, 1994:224) In Aziz’ personal experience,
this meant that he felt less like an emigrant. He even puts it in historical perspective:
“Before on Sundays, from 7-7.15 you had 15 minutes of news for Moroccans on Dutch
channels such as Nederland 1. I remember tuning in cause it was the only thing I could
understand.. that is the way I could finally get some news. Now with satellite tv, I don’t
feel like an emigrant..I have access to so much.” This access is what creates new
relationships and uproots old ones. Hajat commented that she always chats with cousins
in Morocco, so that when she goes back she doesn’t have to feel as if part of some of her
familymembers are strangers.
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4.4 Transnational Livelihood strategies
When I met with Mr. Yousfi, he had been back in Morocco for 2 years. He had spend 28
years in the Netherlands and was married to a Dutch woman. Nevertheless, it seems that
through yearly visits and investments in property Mr. Yousfi, kept effective ties with
Morocco. In 1980, he built a house in Berkane, where he spent his childhood. Almost
twenty years after he had another house built in Saidia, where he currently lives with his
wife. Mr. Yousfi relied on what Salih calls ‘transnational livelihood strategies that
stretches resources and social status to country of origin’. (Salih, 2003:67) Transnational
strategies can also be used as security. When things were not going so well in the
Netherlands for Mr. Yousfi, the option of return was readily available. A crucial
motivation to return were thus pull factors related to transnational belonging. The desire
to engage in transnational practices in order to live more fulfilled lives can be a result of a
continued transnationals consciousness. However, this does not necessarily translate into
being part of transnational community of Moroccans in The Netherlands. For Mr. Yousfi,
engaging with other Moroccans in the Netherlands was never a priority.

4.5 The Second Generation in the Netherlands
When I asked Hajat about what she thinks of the way Moroccans are portrayed in
the Netherlands, she immediately states that it has made her more insecure. “It doesn’t
affect me all the time of course, but sometimes it does. Eventhough I was born and raised
here, I can feel insecure in certain surroundings, like when I am only surrounded by
Dutch people, I feel as if I have to prove myself. I start worrying about what they might
think of me, sometimes I start paying attention to how I speak. I thought the mentioning
of speech very interesting in Hajat’s case. A very politicized issue has been the bad
command that immigrants have of the Dutch language. On whether feeling different has
meant feeling more Moroccan she answers that she thinks it certainly has.She asserts that
it has led her to identify more and more with a transnational community of Moroccans.
”When I am with my family and among other Moroccans, I feel like more myself.” The
feeling of being more Moroccan in the Netherlands, and her conscious seeking of contact
with Moroccans places Hajat in the middle of a transnational social space. The selfquestioning on identity and belonging, besides being a process mediated by outside
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influences, remains something private. Though one must be careful not to make
generalization, my expectation is that like Hajat, many more second generation Dutch are
feeling this way. The contrarily, that second or third generations would completely
disregard their Moroccan descendance could also be the case. The Central Bureau for
Statistics performed a quantitative research to find out why Moroccan youth do not want
to move to Morocco. The three main reasons were “ I like it here” “ I see no future in
country of origin”, “ I have no connection with country of origin”. 11
Interesting to note is the opinions of my older respondents on the position of the
next generations. Aziz states that he really feels bad for the dilemma that Moroccan youth
are facing in the Netherlands. According to him, they are facing an identity crisis as a
result of being in two cultures. He even mentions the example of his own children. Other
people consistenty tell these kids that they are Moroccan, but they don’t know necessarily
what it means to be Moroccan.“They start asking why people notice that they are
different.” Mr. Yousfi felt entirely ‘Dutch’ during his time there, he owned two café’s,
married a Dutch woman, but still shares that his 19 year old son “Always felt a bit out of
place..he always felt a bit more Moroccan.” Children of Moroccan migrants are shoved
an identity that they are not sure if they should be proud of, given what they hear and see
around them about Moroccans. The participants that I interviewed who were born in
Morocco, but whose children are born in the Netherlands also shared the insight with me
that they do think that their children will consider themselves primarily as Dutch persons.
Mohammed mentions that, “Ultimately our education was completely different then
theirs.” Karim also believes that his children mostly see Morocco as a vacation country.
Although it is documented that children often push their families to seek for social
recognition in countries of residence, my respondents also affirmed that their children
seek to know more about Morocco as a way to be able to feel connected to their parents
or grandparents.

11

www.cbs.nl/nl-NL/menu/themas/bevolking/publicaties/artikelen/archief/2005/2005
NL/menu/themas/bevolking/publicaties/artikelen/archief/2005/2005-1759
1759-wm.htm
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4.6 Dual Citizenship
The question of citizenship opens the way to ‘negotiations of identities between states
and immigrants’ (Kastoryano 2002). Having dual citizenship opens up an avenue for
increased transnational activity. However, citizenship also has meaning on its own and
relates to feelings of being at home. Mohammed gives an interesting opinion on having
Moroccan citizenship:“ Even if you don’t use your Moroccan paspoort, you can keep it
in corner in the closet, but you won’t do away with it. It is just a piece of paper, but from
inside it feels different.” To Aziz, Karim, Mohammed and Taib, the Moroccan paspoort
is more valuable than the Dutch passport, and if they would have to choose they would
all choose for the former. Aziz states that he thinks the king has done well to insist that
Moroccan keep dual citizenship. He believes that the Netherlands should not pressure
Morocco to give up on its citizens. “ I don’t like that the Netherlands puts systematic
pressure to choose between one or the other, I don’t like the way the Netherlands is
bullying Morocco.”Aziz fervently believs that the Moroccan nationality is something to
be proud of; “You don’t get a Moroccan nationality easy if you are a foreigner”. It
appears that most of my interviewees did not perceive having dual citizenship as a
‘loyalty’ matter; they all had built relatively succesful lives in the Netherlands in spite of
the fact that they passionately embraced being Moroccan, and what that meant in the eyes
of the host-society.
When I asked Mr. N about how he feels on not being able to lose his Moroccan
citizenship, he reiterated what Aziz had posited. He is glad he was able to keep his
Moroccan nationality, and states that the Moroccan nationality is something to be proud
of. Perhaps more suprisingly, so did his son, who was born in the Netherlands.He
completely agreed with his father and stated that having dual citizenship, and dual
identities equaled being ‘richer’. He expressed that,” The richness I have received,
nobody can take that from me.” On the other hand receiving a Dutch passport after 3
years in the Netherlands, did play a role in making the majority of them feel at home in
the Netherlands. For Karim, it meant that,“When you get a Dutch paspoort, then you feel
a bit Dutch, cause you rights like the others.”
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4.7 To integrate or not to integrate?
According to Mr. Yousfi,“Living in a country does have an effect on you. For the sake of
living a better, more inclusive life, you do have to learn and know something about the
country you are living in.” On the one hand, my Moroccan- Dutch respondents found that
their religion and culture keeps them connected to Morocco, but on the other hand they
also thought that this makes it more difficult for them to be considered as full citizens in
the Netherlands, a topic that Mr. N touched on. When I asked Karim whether a stong
bond with Morocco could be an obstacle to integration, he said that what he does believe
to be a barrier to integration is the attitudes of the Dutch themselves. He spoke about how
he often experiences stigmatization. “For us to integrate, the Dutch also have to become
blind to etnicity, cause the first thing they see is your appearance, I am still judged by
that. I will never look Dutch, so I don’t think I can escape that.” Karim points out to the
process of ‘othering’ that takes place on a daily basis in the Netherlands. He does not
have Dutch appearance and sees that as a permanent obstacle in other’s identification of
him as a Dutch person. The question that appears to be unanswered to my interviewees–
despite Dutch politicians’ consistent use of the term– is what does ‘integration’ really
mean? The experience of feeling ‘integrated’ is there, but the other sentiment is that
others in Dutch society are always questioning and measuring to what degree you are
‘integrated’.

4.8 State-sponsored Moroccan Transnationalism: a reality ?
Of all my informants Aziz was the most outspoken and positive on the role of Moroccan
institutions in allowing and encouraging transnational activity.“It matters a lot that
Morocco does so much to welcome us. I am proud of that.We are superior than other
immigrants in the world, because of that bond we have with our country, Morocco. It is
not just the passport, we are different, we have something more.” You can’t compare us
with Surinamese, or even the Algerians. Morocco has something special that other
countries do not have. He talks about how happy he is that a huge step forward has been
made. We have been working at it hard this past 10 years. What stuck out to me, is that
when I asked him about whether Morocco’s direct involvement had an impact on his life
he answered using plural: Yes, we are happy and thankful! I think Moroccans love it. I
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like it, I get attention from my country, that is beautiful. I hope that we don’t lose, that
Morocco also reaches a standard level and that we could go home with pride. I am happy
that things are being done. Morocco now even has a minister for people abroad. I have
met this man and he had a message to spread to 4 million people abroad, that is a lot of
work but Morocco knows it needs to invest in its citizens abroad in order not to lose
them, cause that would be sad.” Though Aziz seems to believe that all people who still
describe themselves as Moroccan must feel that way, Karim had an entirely opposing
view: “I left because of the state, it is the Moroccan system that I didn’t like. Still the
state doesn’t do anything for me.”“I don’t see they are organizing a lot, I havent seen
them, I don’t hear them.” His opinion is that it is all bureaucratic policies that serves the
elite and that in the Netherlands he doesn’t see an impact of Morocco’s engagement
policies. Taib also conveyed that the state bothered him more than it helped him. ‘You
only see the state when it comes to paperwork, for example when you want to name your
kids”. The different ways in which the participants reacted underlines that the state does
not have always have an impact in engaging Moroccan-Dutch in transnationality. The
difference between when it does or does not, can be a larger matter such as the impact of
Dutch government narrative over Morocco’s discourse on eternal belonging, but it could
aslo be the result of personal motives. Thus I do not dare draw conclusions.

4.9 Reaction to political discourse in The Netherlands
Mr. Yousfi’s opinion on negative political discourse in the Netherlands is that is
getting a bit out of hand; “They have to stop that before things get out of hand”,
especially the media needs to stop targeting they youth. There are Dutch youngsters that
misbehave too, they just make things bigger when Moroccans are involved”. Yet political
issues never played a role in his decision to move back. It was for economic reasons more
than anything. He had been running a café for years, but because of deteriorating business
and the rising cost of living he had to close it. Consequently, his income was not
enough.‘The stick’ in driving him back to Morocco, his home country, was not an
increasing unwelcome feeling.
For the four men in Europe, the hostile climate towards Moroccan (and muslims
in general ) was definitely leading them to consider returning to Morocco.
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Aziz believes that that immigrants will soon stop coming because of the way Europe is
changing: “ You can already see people going back, some Turks are already leaving.” If
we could get the same life that we have here, we would go too. In Taib’s opinion, the
Netherlands is not the same country it used to be anymore. Times have changed
drastically and he definitely does not feel welcome there anymore. Going back to
Morocco is not a manner of if, it is a manner of when. Of all the respondents he was the
one the most clear about stating a direct corrrelation between reason for return and
changing political discourse in the Netherlands. However, Karim is the one to bring up
Wilders a few times: “His ideology is so dangerous. All he does is provoke people and
push them in a corner”. He sees Dutch politics, currently led by Wilders, as waging a
war on Islam. Karim also believes that people in the Netherlands are increasingly fearing
Muslims as a result of misinformation. They don’t try to see the other Islam, they don’t
know that Islam actually means “La paix’. Though Moroccan Dutch are able to contruct
their lives and maintain membership in both countries, politics of cultural difference have
also resounded in their lives. They have created lives in the Netherlands, and their homes
are there, but the fact that they identify with a transnational community
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Conclusion
The stories of these individuals taught me that there are multiple ways in which
individuals can engage in transnationalism. The case of Morocco shows that a state can
also devise or shape transnational processes and provide legitimate incentives to
encourage transnational activities. At the same time, the Netherlands has been also been a
influential in framing the debate; discussions on whether integration can happen if
migrants and their families are living part of their economic and social lives across
borders is affecting how individuals think about their position in the Netherlands. I would
posit that instead of interrupting the link with Morocco, the Dutch political discourse has
been most succesful in leading people, especially youth, to seek comfort and strength in a
transnational community. Transnational activity in effect is not curbed, transnational
consciousness appears to be fortified. The ‘Paradox Marocaine’ continues as individuals
of mutual heritage are bonding in their country of residence in order to buttress their
position in their claim for the right to make a living there according to their wishes. Fact
is that migrants desire to partake in certain practices that might not be the practices of the
majority, but that they see as necessary to live a more fulfilled life. Within nation-states
the struggle for equality that citizenship entails is extended to different domains, often
turning negotiations of interest into negotiations of identity (Kastoryano, 2005:693)
One should also not assume that those with stronger social ties will be more
transnationally active than those with weaker connections nor that the actions and
identities of those with more indirect ties are less influenced by the dynamics within the
field than those with direct transnational ties. Individuals within transnational social
fields combine ways of being and ways of belonging differently in specific contexts, so
that the construction of self and home between two countries occurs differently for each
individual, and this also decides how this contruction impacts the ones in the individual’s
surroundings, particularly in the case of children. (Levy, Glick Schiller, 2004)
Eventhough individuals might be moving towards non-national sources of identity, the
creation of diverse common identities is still likely.
The global shift in demographic within nation-states, with societies becoming
increasingly multiculturalist, inter- religious and inter-racial will continue to add levels of
complexity. Definitions of national culture and consciousness will continuously have to
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adapt. I presume that discussions surrounding what is distinctively Dutch or European,
and what is Moroccan and by extension Muslim, will continuously take place. The
meeting of images and multicultural realities is a place where power, identities are
negotiated and renegotiated; a place where essentialization of the individual should
become more scarce. The notion that Muslims or Moroccans cannot ‘integrate’ will be
challenged, and surely by individuals within the transnational social space between
Morocco and The Netherlands. Publics would perceive the issue of integration in a
different way had they been offered another narrative; a different framing of the subject
could have given individuals more the opportunity to choose.
I believe it is important to construct consciousness not only in the context of the
state but for what it means to be human. This means setting the focus on a civic nation
wherein ethnic or religious distinction are present but not dominant. The idea of a nation
based on equal individual rights, regardless of origin, and with equal recognition of all
cultural traditions in the public sphere. An inclusive consciousness needs to be formed
through education that encourages participation and representation within the nationstate, but one that embraces difference in unity. I concur with Tariq Modood (2007), in
that “The plurality, then, is ever present - and each part of the plurality has a right both to
be a part of the whole and to speak up for itself and for its vision of the whole12.

12

http://www.opendemocracy.net/faith-europe_islam/multiculturalism_4627.jsp
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